The current state of al-Qaeda is an interesting topic to explore. We are now 20 years past the U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa, 18 years past the U.S.S. Cole bombing in Yemen, and 17 years post 9/11. Despite the years that have passed, we unfortunately lost Sgt. Leandro Jasso with the Army’s elite 75th Ranger Regiment over Thanksgiving weekend to an al-Qaeda small arms attack. And not only an al-Qaeda attack, an attack in southwestern Afghanistan’s Nimruz Province, where it was not really known that al-Qaeda was operating. Western Afghanistan is far away from the mountainous eastern and northern Afghanistan where most U.S. forces engage al-Qaeda fighters. And last week we lost four U.S. soldiers to a Taliban road side bomb attack. This attack was the largest single loss of life for U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan since 2015. Additionally, al-Qaeda is now fighting in more countries than it was in 2001. So, what does all this mean for the current state of their operation?
In 2011 Osama bin Laden’s #2 in command, Ayman al- Zawahiri took over as the global leader of al-Qaeda. As I described in one of my previous articles, “The Next Bin Laden”, we have also seen Osama’s son Hamza bin Laden moving into a leadership role. With many other top al-Qaeda leadership hiding in Pakistan (such as bin Laden) and Iran.
As was stated previously al-Qaeda’s brand has spread, and they now operate in more countries than they did in 2001. They have thousands of operatives in countries ranging from south Asia, to the middle east, to west/north/east Africa. Their main affiliate outside of Afghanistan is AQAP (al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula), headquarter in Yemen. They have taken over territory in Yemen, and boast around 7,000 fighters.
They also have AQIS (al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent). This organization operates in south Asian countries like Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. Next, we have al-Shabaab in Somalia. They are operating in east Africa, and helping to destabilize a country that has been in turmoil since before the U.S.’s “Black Hawk Down” incident in 1993. Moving west into Africa, their next affiliate is AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). They operate mainly in Algeria in northern and western Africa. They are closely tied to, and back, Ansar al-Sharia who were responsible for the infamous September 11th, 2012 attacks in Benghazi, Libya. Then moving to the far western parts of Africa we have Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM). They operate in Mali and other west African countries. Finally, we have Jabhat al-Nusrah, which is al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria. Even though the group has split into several factions and formed new groups, the U.S. still considers them AQ’s Syrian affiliate.
Estimations show al-Qaeda troop strengths around 7,000 in Yemen, 5,000 in Somalia, 5.000 in Libya, and 15,000 in Syria, the group still consists of a large base of supporters. And this doesn’t include the fighters in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries. So why has al-Qaeda been able to hang around, and thrive?
You have to keep in mind, al-Qaeda is fueled by an idea. An idea is hard to destroy. And the ideology takes time to die out, if it even ever does. They see themselves as the vanguard of Islamic revolution. That the rest of the world is in a state of ignorance, and that their group, as small as it may be, is set out to save the world from this state of darkness. Until this idea is proved as being false, it will continue to be a reason why the group has validity.
As has been mentioned the group is operating in extremely war torn and volatile ungoverned countries. Afghanistan has been in a state of instability since the 1980’s, Somalia since 1991, Yemen in the early 2000’s, and Iraq since the U.S. invasion in 2003. The Arab Spring in 2011 also created a ripe environment for jihadist groups in countries like Syria. Until some of these countries become more stable, and have effective governments in place, they will continue to be an attractive home to groups like al-Qaeda.
The structure that al-Qaddafi has in place has also allowed it to stick around since its creation in 1988. The minutes from their very first meeting in August 1988 are heavily devoted to organization and structure. They are hierarchical and rule based, but regional commanders have broad leeway to prioritize strategies to the local conditions where they operate, following integrating leadership strategic priorities. The subordinate affiliates act in the strategic interest with the group. They even create strong personal relationships within the groups through battlefield brotherhood and marriage. Sometimes this structure can backfire, such as when ISIS disobeyed leadership and broke off from the group. But most often this decentralized management of the group allows for better operations and stability, makes them more agile and flexible, and more efficient exchanges of power when a commander is killed. This is a great example of centralized decision making and decentralized execution.
The U.S. also played a part in helping al-Qaeda stay relevant, and grow. With the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Iraq army, one of the largest in the world, was disbanded. This put hundreds of thousands of men out of work. Many would go on to help form and lead al-Qaeda in Iraq, which would eventually turn into ISIS in 2010. While ISIS was flashy and in your face, with bold statements and high quality propaganda videos, al-Qaeda was slowly and quietly embedding themselves in these unstable communities and gaining the trust of fellow Muslims who couldn’t trust their government , or felt the U.S. presence in their country was harming them. For example al-Shabaab in Somalia is very environmental. They don’t allow outside food or aid into the land they control, but they have banned plastic bags. A total head scratcher. They use these tactics to gain the trust of the occupants of their controlled territory.
Despite these things, the U.S and others have made headway in getting rid of the group. The invasion of Afghanistan did take out numerous key al-Qaeda commanders. Including Osama bin Laden in 2011. They do lack a strong base. While they are spread out over countries, the leadership remains in hiding, on the run, and often have difficult times with communication among group members. This is due to U.S. counterterrorism and having helped over 100 other countries with their counterterrorism tactics. We also still maintain troops in several of these countries, and drone strikes take place virtually every day. Integral leaders are being captured and killed every month.
But in conclusion the U.S has spent $2.8 trillion on defense spending, and is still bogged down in several countries. Al-Qaeda has morphed into a larger network, and the Taliban has grown to over 60,000 and control most of Afghanistan. Back in September on the anniversary of 9/11 the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, explained who to continue to confront America. He urged his followers to continue to fight America wherever they are found. He condemned the moving of U.S. embassy in Israel to Jerusalem as America having a Jewish bias, and for continuing to meddle in other Muslim countries. This group will continue to remain resilient until the idea and not the group is defeated, Middle Eastern countries become stable politically and economically, and their false Islamic message based on fear and despair is countered. Fighting an ideology is a long process, and we must remain resilient as well.
Sources:
Barr, Nathaniel, Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed. “How Al-Qaeda works: The Jihadist Group’s Evolving Organizational Design”, huson.org
Bergen, Peter, “Jihadist Terrorism 17 years after 9/11” 09/10/18, newamerica.org
Bulos, Nabih, “Seventeen years after 9/11, Al Qaeda May be Stronger than ever” , 09/10/18, latimes.com
Byman, Daniel, “Judging Al Qaeda’s Record, Part II: Why Has Al Qaeda Declined?”, 6/20/17, lawfareblog.come
Gibbons-Neff, Thomas, “Fourth Soldier Dies After Coordinated Bomb Blast in Afghanistan”, nytimes.com, 12/03/18
Joscelyn, Thomas, “Al Qaeda is very much alive, and widely misunderstood”, 9/11/18, longwarjournal.org
Josecelyn, Thomas, “Al-Qaeda leader: America is the main enemy in a ‘single war with different fronts’”, 09/11/18, longwarjournal.org
Netz, Steven, “Is Al-Qaeda Winning?”, worldpoliticsreview.org, 9/14/18
Soufan, Ali, “Al-Qaeda is thriving, despite our endless war. Can we ever defeat it?”, buzzfeednews.com, 10/29/18